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INTRODUCTION 
Tne frequency of occurrence of events, specifically the frequency 
of reinforcment, has been theorized to play a major role in the main-
tenance of depression. Behavioral theorists (e.g., Ferster, 1974; 
Lewinsohn, 1974a, 1974bl have argued that depression may result from a 
lack or loss of ratnforcement ~astman, 1976}. Cognitive theorists, on 
the other hand, have stressed the importance of the depressive's inter-
pretation and distortion of nis reinforcement experiences (Beck, 1974). 
In tnis vie~, the depressive's sensitivity to the frequency of rein-
forcement, i.e., the perceived frequency, is considered to be more 
important than the actual frequency of reinforcement. 
That distortions of frequency information can and do occur is an 
idea that is central to cognitive theories of depression. However, 
Hasher and Zacks (1979} propose that acquisition o~J frequency informa-
tion is an qautomatic" process and is not affected by states that alter 
attentional capacity, such as depression. This theory is interesting 
as there is substantial evidence that shows that judgments of frequency 
are different for depressed and nondepressed subjects (e.g., Buchwald, 
1977; Nelson & Craighead, 1977; Wener & Rehm, 1975). However, there is 
also evidence to support the notion tnat frequency encoding is an 
nautomatic" process (and, therefore, cannot be affected by mood state) 
(c.f., Hasher & Zacks, 1979, Exp. 3}. The present research is intended 
to investigate tnis apparent discrepancy and clarify the relationship 
between depression and the processing of frequency information. 
1 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Frequency Encoding as an Automatic Process 
It is well established that human beings have an extraordinary 
sensitivity to differences in the relative frequency of events, even 
for events that seem to have no adaptive value. College students can 
accurately estimate the relative background frequencies of words 
(Shapiro, ~9691, single letters (Attneave, 1953), and even pairs of 
letters Ctlnderwood, ~97~al .. They can accurately judge the situational 
frequency with which. words occur in a list (Hintzman, l969), and make 
separate judgments of the frequency of occurrence for words that occur 
at varying frequencies in two different lists CHintzman & Block, 1971; 
Reichardt, Shaughnessy, & Zimmerman, l973l .. Subjects can also give 
accurate frequency judgments for verbatim repetition of sentences and 
can keep this information separate from frequency information about 
the repetition of sentences containing the same underlying meaning 
(Gude & Zechlneister, ~9751 .. 
In addition to this amazing sensitivity to frequency information, 
the ability to process frequency information is not affected by many 
manipulations that usually cause differences in the recall of informa-
tion .. Sensitivity to frequency of occurrence shows no improvement with 
practice (Hasher & Chromiak, l977); instructions and instructional set 
have no effect on frequency sensitivity (Flexser & Bower, 1975; Howell, 
~973; Rose & Rowe, ~976); and frequency sensitivity appears to be 
fully developed at an early age (as early as second grade, i.e., 
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approximately eight years oldl, and shows no developmental trend 
thereafter (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977). 
Hasher and Zacks ll979} suggest that the encoding of frequency 
information is an "automatic" process. They describe automatic pro-
cesses as those that 
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operate continually to encode certain attributes of whatever 
information is the focus of attention. Once a process is 
automatized, it can no longer be improved upon either by 
additional practice or by feedback about earlier performance. 
Automatic processes do not require either awareness or intention, 
and their operation cannot be willfully inhibited. They drain 
minimal amounts of energy from attentional capacity, allowing 
the organism to continue to operate even when extraordinarily 
high d~nds are made upon that capacity, as in moments of 
high stress or injury. The knowledge gained by automatic 
processes is accessible to conciousness and can then be used 
in a number of ways ••• (p. 359} 
Automatic process~s are contrasted to ''effortful" processes 
which "re~uire effort and so limit one's ability to engage simul-
taneously in other effortful processes. The efficiency of effortful 
memory operations increases with practice, and their use is voluntary, 
often occurring only with specific instructions. We are almost always 
aware of the effortful processing mechanisms we are using." (p. 362). 
For exampler Hasher and Zacks postulate imagery, mnemonic or elabora-
tive devices, organization and clustering, and rehearsal to be effort-
4 
ful processes. 
Underlying Hasher and Zacks' theory is the concept of attentional 
capacity. Viewed as a nonspecific limited resource for cognitive proces-
sing, attentional capacity is needed in varying amounts for carrying 
out mental operations. Variations in attentional capacity should (by 
definitionl have major effects on the efficiency of effortful processes, 
but CPy definitionl have no effect on automatic processes. Automatic 
processes require minimal drain on capacity and so should not be af-
fected by altered cognitive capacity. One state that is assumed to 
alter attentional capacity is depression. Therefore, if the processing 
of frequency information is an automatic process, judgments of frequency 
should be as accurate for depressives as they are for nondepressives. 
Hasher and Zacks (Experiment 3) investigated differences in 
frequency judgments in depressed and nondepressed adults. Suscepti-
bility to confusion from subjective sources was also examined. Subjects 
were classified as depressed or nondepressed on the basis of their 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). (The median BDI score 
of 8.5 was used as the criterion to divide the subjects. The mean 
BDI scores were lS.O for the depressed group and 4.9 for the nonde-
pressed group.l The subjects were shown 36 pictures representing 
common objects. There were three presentation frequencies of the 
pictures; a picture could be shown one, two, or three times. Subjects 
were given eight study trials, each of which consisted of the presen-
tation of nine different pictures; these were alternated with eight 
imagination trials. The imagination trials were used in order to 
study confusion from subjective sources. On each imagination trial, 
the experimenter named six of the pictures and the subject was re-
quired to imagine each of them for 5 sec. There were three imagination 
frequencies of the pictures: over the eight imagination trials, a 
picture could be named zero, one, or two times. A frequency test was 
given immediately after presentation of the last imagination trial. 
Subjects were again shown each picture and were asked to tell the 
number of times they had se.en it. !t was emphasized that they were to 
report how many times they had seen the picture, not how many times 
they had imagined it. 
Results showed that the mean estimates of the frequency of 
occurrence increased with the actual frequency of occurrence, and 
these judgments of frequency were identical for depressed and nondep-
ressed subjects. Imagined frequency significantly affected judgments 
of actual frequency: increases in imagined frequency caused increases 
in judgments of presentation frequency. However, these increases were 
the same far depressed and nondepressed subjects. Again, the groups 
did not differ in their estimates. 
Hasher and Zacks concluded that depressed and nondepressed sub-
jects can equally estimate the frequency of occurrence of events; both 
depressed and nandepressed subjects shaw a tendency to confuse inter-
nally generated information with externally experienced events; and 
depressed subjects are no mare likely than nondepressed subjects to 
confuse actual with imagined events. The results support Hasher and 
Zacks contention that frequency encoding is an automatic process. 
5 
Frequency Judgments, Depression, and Availability of Information 
Although Hasher and Zacks cite only their single study in sup-
port of their proposal that sensitivity to frequency information is not 
affected by depression, a relevant body of research already exists in 
this area. 
In the search for the cause(sl of depression, behavioral theor-
ists have focused on reinforcement contingencies and have suggested 
that depression is a function of the rate of reinforcement. Lewinsohn 
(l974al has stated that a low rate of positive reinforcement acts as 
an eliciting stimulus for some depressive behaviors, such as feelings 
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of dysphoria, fatigue, and a low rate of activity and verbal behavior. 
Lewinsohn's behavioral theory emphasizes the total or absolute amounts 
of positive reinforcment. For example, one of the theory's assumptions 
is that the total amount of positive reinforcement received by depressed 
persons is less than that received by nondepressed persons. In contrast 
to this, other theories have emphasized the cognitive aspects of dep-
ression. Beck (1974}, for example, postulates that depressives construe 
the self, the world, and the future in a negative way, and that this 
negative view is maintained by cognitively distorting events that would 
be inconsistent with this view (minimizing achievements, maximizing 
problems, and ignoring contrary evidence, for example). In the cog-
nitive theories, it is not the total or absolute amount of positive 
reinforcement that is important, but the depressive's perception and 
distortion of the amount of reinforcement. 
Investigations of the relationship between amount of reinforce-
ment and depression have supported the hypothesis that depressive's 
judgments of the frequency of reinforcement may be inaccurate. In a 
study by Wener and Rehm (1975}, depressed and nondepressed subjects 
were given either 80~ or 20' positive reinforcement on a pseudosocial 
intelligence task .. When a~d to judge the frequency of positive 
reinforcement, the depressed sUbjects• estimates were significantly 
lower than the nondepressed subjectsR estimates under both rates of 
reinforcement .. Buch.wald (19771 gave "right/wrong" correctness of 
response feedback on every trial of a Thorndikian (multiple-choice} 
learning task tsa' right; SO' wrong}, and found that subjects with 
h.igh.er depression ~ores Unore depressed} tended to underestimate the 
number of correct responses more, while subjects with lower depression 
scores {less depressed or nondepressedl tended to underestimate less 
or to overestimate .. Nelson and Craighead (1977}, using a multiple 
choice perception task, gave depressed and nondepressed subjects high 
(70%} or low (30%} rates of either reinforcement or punishment. At a 
high rate of reinforcement, the depressed subjects significantly 
underestimated the frequency of reinforcement. At a low rate of punish-
ment, the depressed subjects• estimates of the frequency of punishment 
were greater than the nondepressed subjects• estimates. but this did 
not reflect a tendency for the depressed subjects to overestimate the 
amount of punishment they had received. Rather, the depressed subjects 
were accurate in their estimations of frequency of punishment, while 
the nondepressed subjects significantly underestimated the actual 
frequency of punishment. 
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Apparently in contradiction to the Hasher and Zacks' theory, the 
results of these studies indicate that the judgments of frequency of 
occurrence tin tnis case, occurrence of reinforcement or punishment) 
are affected by a depressed mood. Although not consistent with Hasher 
and Zacks' theory, these results may be consistent with an availability 
heuristic for judging frequency. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) propose 
that frequency judgments are made on the basis of availability, i.e., 
the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. For example, in 
one study (l973, Exp. 8}, Tversky and Kahneman presented their subjects 
with one of two types of lists: either a list consisting of the names 
of l9 famous women and 20 less famous men, or a list consisting of the 
names of 19 famous men and 20 less famous women. The subjects were 
asked either to recall the names or to judge whether more male or more 
female names had been presented. More famous names were recalled than 
less famous names (mean recall: 12.3 and 8.4, respectively), and of 
those subjects recalling the names, 66% recalled more famous than 
nonfamous names while only 15% recalled more nonfamous than famous 
names. Of those subjects who judged the frequency of occurrence of 
male and female names, 81% erroneously judged the class consisting of 
the more famous names to be more frequent. Tversky and Kahneman take 
these results and others in their study to .be supportive of the notion 
that people judge the frequency of a class by its availability. Avail-
ability is operationally defined as what is recalled. Famous names were 
more easily recalled than less famous names, and so are judged to have 
occurred more frequently than the less famous names. 
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Additional support for the availability heuristic comes from a 
study by Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1977} in which Hebrew-speaking 
students were asked to estimate the number of countries or kibbutzim 
beginning with certain (Hebrew) letters. Measures of availability were 
successful in predicting some estimates, including some errors, but 
Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff caution that availability was not the only 
determinant of judged frequency and suggest that other, situation-
specific, factors also influenced frequency estimates. Specifically, 
they suggest that a factor influencing their results was the subjects' 
knowledge of the lexicographic structure of the language, and give the 
example that "subjects may have known that 'Aleph' is a much more 
popular initial letter than 'Yud', a factor which could have tempered 
their reliance on availability information ••• " (p. 237). (Subjects may 
know which is a more popular initial letter because generally they can 
think of more words that start with one letter than the other; in 
other words, they may have tempered their reliance on availability 
information by utilizing other availability information.) 
Lichtenstein; Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978) exa-
mined frequency judgments for various causes of death. In Experiment l, 
causes of death with varying frequencies of occurrence were paired (for 
example, tuberculosis- flood}. Subjects were asked to judge which 
cause of death was more likely and to give an estimate of how much more 
likely the one cause of death was than the other. (Per year per one 
hundred million u.s. residents, the frequency of tuberculosis is 1,800 
and the frequency of flood is 100. Therefore, the ratio of occurrence 
9 
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of tuberculosis to flood would be 18:1.) Lichtenstein et al. found that, 
for these relative frequency judgments, subjects generally were able to 
identify the more frequent cause of death, as long as the true ratio 
was 2:l or greater. Below 2:1, discrimination was often poor. Subjects 
also displayed a tendency to underestimate large ratios. In Experiment 3, 
Lichtenstein et al. had subjects make absolute estimates of the fre-
quencies of 40 causes of death. To help them make their estimates, 
subjects were given a standard: one group of subjects was told that the 
frequency of death in the u.s. due to motor vehicle accidents was 50,000 
per year; another group was told l,OOO deaths per year were caused by 
electrocution. The resulting estimates, although highly correlated with 
true frequency, were not substantially accurate. Bias was again found: 
subjects underestimated high-frequency events and overestimated low-
frequency events. Lichtenstein et al. also report a secondary bias: 
overestimation associated with highly publicized deaths (such as cancer, 
homicide, tornado, etc.l and underestimation associated with undrama-
tic, "quiet" deaths (_such as asthma, diabetes, tuberculosis, etc.). 
Lichtenstein et al. suggest that one possible explanation for these 
under- and overestimations can be found in the availability heuristic: 
sensational, highly publicized deaths which are easy to recall are 
judged to be very frequent, while causes of deaths, instances of which 
are hard to recall, are judged to be infrequent. 
The results of the depression studies can also be explained by 
the availability neuristic. Lloyd and Lishman (1975) and Teasdale and 
Fogarty (19791 have found that depressed subjects retrieve unpleasant 
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memories to stimulus words more quickly than they retrieve pleasant 
memories. Johnson, Petzel, Hartney, and Morgan (1981) have also reported 
a differential recall effect for depressed and nondepressed subjects. 
Subjects were given 20 different tasks - solving mazes, cancelling 
vowels,, decoding messages, unscrambl.ing anagrams, etc • - and were 
allowed. to complete half of the tasks, but were interrupted prior to 
completion on the other half. White (1979} has argued that completion 
of a task is intrinsically rewarding; therefore, subjects were assumed 
to be reinforced on half the tasks and nonreinforced on the other half. 
After administration of all tasks, the subjects were asked to write 
down the names or descriptions of as many of the tasks as they could 
recall. Johnson et al. found that depressed subjects recalled signifi-
cantly more of th.e uncompleted (nonreinforced) tasks than the completed 
~einforced.l tasks. This finding was opposite of that for nondepressive 
subjects who recalled significantly more completed than uncompleted 
tasks. From these studies it can be seen that the information available 
to the depressive is quite different from that which is available to 
the nondepressive, and is in accordance with the reported frequency 
judgments of depressives and nondepressives, i.e., depressives under-
estimate positive reinforcement Cit is less available) and nondepres-
sives Cat least in one study - Nelson & Craighead, 1977) underestimate 
amount of punishment (nonreinforcement- also less available). 
Automaticity and Depression: Methodological Differences 
In evaluating the effect of depression on sensiti.vity to fre-
quency information, there are two sets of studies under consideration: 
those studies that have been incorporated into and support Hasher and 
Zacks' theory of automatic encoding (hereafter referred to as the 
"frequency studtesn since these studies tend to focus on the frequency 
judgments th.emselvesl_; and the lldepression studies" (labeled as such 
since these studies use frequency judgments as a method of studying 
depression!. Th.e results of these two sets of studies appear to con-
flict. This may not be the case, however, as there are several method-
ological differences between the sets. The two sets of studies differ 
in the type of stimuli that ~re presented, the type of judgment the 
subject is required to make, and what is accepted as an accurate 
judgment (see Table ll. 
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The stimuli that have been used in the frequency studies have 
been innocuous, neutral items, usually common nouns. Hasher and Zacks 
used pictures of common objects that would be familiar to young children. 
The depression studies, on the other hand, require subjects to make 
judgments about emotionally-charged events. For example, the subject 
is required to tell how many times he was "right" or "wrong". The 
subject's estimation is concerned with his performance on a task, and, 
therefore, reflects back on him personally. 
The studies also differ in the type of judgment the subject is 
required to make. In the frequency studies, subjects make judgments of 
item frequency. The subject is presented a list of items; throughout 
the list, items are repeated varying number of times. The subject is 
then required to estimate the frequency of occurrence of each individual 
item. In the depression studies, (and also in studies of availability), 
Table l 
Major Methodological Differences 
Stimuli 
Judgment Required 
Accuracy of JUdgment 
Frequency Studies 
innocuous 
item frequency 
relative accuracy 
Depression Studies 
emotionally-charged 
category frequency 
absolute accuracy 
13 
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subjects make judgments of category frequency. The subject is presented 
a list of items, none of which are repeated. The subject is required to 
respond to each. ttem, and then is given "success/failure" feedback on 
his response. After presentation of the items, subjects are required to 
estimate ~e frequency of one of the feedback categories: either the 
frequency of their successes, or the frequency of their failures. 
The dtfference between the studies as to what is accepted as an 
accurate judgment has also contributed to the apparent ¢onflict of 
results·. The frequency studies accepted as accurate those judgments 
that were accurate in a relative sense. That is, items with an actual 
frequency of five are judged to be more frequent than items with an 
actual frequency of three. However, these judgments were not always 
accurate in an absolute sense: as the actual frequency of the items 
increased, so did the discrepancy between actual frequency and judged 
frequency. This has been reported by others; for example, Hintzman 
(19691 found that judged frequency increased with the log of true 
frequency. The depression studies, on the other hand, have reported 
their results only in terms of absolute accuracy. The results show, 
however, that relative judgments of frequency are accurate for both 
depressed and nondepressed people; that is, both depressives and 
nondepressives report higher frequencies of reinforcement than punish-
ment when they have been reinforced more, and higher frequencies of 
punishment tlta,n reinforcement wh.en they have been punished more. It 
:i:.s in the absol.ute judgrnents of frequency that the differences between 
depressed. and nondepressed persons are found. For example, in the 
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Nelson and Craighead (19771 study in which the subject had been rein-
forced 28 times, the mean frequency judgments for the depressed subjects 
was 22.5, while for the nondepressed subjects, it was 29.5. While the 
no~epressives were accurate in t~eir judgments (29.5 was not signifi-
cantly different from 281, the depreS&~ves underestimated the amount of 
reinforcement they had rece~ved (22.5 was significantly different from 
28 and from 29 .• SL 1\fteJ:: recei-ving 12 punishment trials, the mean 
frequency judgment for the depressives- was l3, while for the nondepres-
sives, it was 7 .62. !n this: case, th.e depress-ives were accurate in 
their judgments· of frequency while the nondepressives significantly 
underestimated the actual amount. 
These differences in methodology suggest that the frequency 
studies and the depression studies may be investigating different 
phenomena. If this is the case, then the results of these studies may 
not necessarily be contradictory. 
Automaticity and Availability: A Reexamination of Theory 
The results of the frequency studies may be explained by Hasher 
and Zacks' concept of automaticity~ the results of the depression 
studies may be explained by Tversky and Kahneman's availability heuris-
tic. The studies themselves have been reexamined~ the roles that auto-
maticity and availability play in judgments of frequency of occurrence 
also need to be reexamined and evaluated. In this reexamination, it is 
i'lnportant t~ note that "automatic processes" are concerned only with 
the encoding of information, while the availability heuristic is used 
only in the retrieval of information. 
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If frequency information is automatically encoded as Hasher and 
Zacks propose, and if it is_ stored and retrieved just as it is encoded, 
then mood state Gind many other variables) would have no effect on 
judgments of frequency, either relative or absolute (this is inherent 
in Hasher and Zacks' defini-tion>:. This is, of course, not what has been 
found: absolute frequency jud~ents can be affected by depression. 
Therefore, mextJory for frequency information must be faulty in at least 
one of its three phases: encoding, s-torage, or retrieval. 
EncQding of frequency information may not, of course, be an 
automatic process. If the concept of automatic encoding is completely 
rejected, ~owever, it becomes difficult to explain certain findings. 
For example, one of t~e components of the concept of automatic~ty is 
that "automatic proceases do not require either awareness or intention, 
and their operation cannot be willfully inhibited" (Hasher & Zacks, 
p. 3591. rf thts is rejected, can a reasonable argument be made that, 
in tQeir day--to-day living, people nave tried to keep track of the 
frequencies of words, letters-, and bigrams? Clearly, the concept of 
automaticity cannot be rejected totally. It is useful to accept the 
idea that ~e processing of frequency information is automatic in that 
it is a conttnuous process not requiring awareness and intention. How-
ever, this does not exclude the possibility that processing can be 
affected by ma~ t~ngs. For example, processing may be affected by 
selective attentton. rndeed, Hasher and Zacks state that processing 
occurs on •t~tever information is the focus of attention" (p. 359}. 
Given an array of information, if it is not in the interest of a person 
to pay equal attention to all parts of the array, all parts of the 
array may not be equally encoded, and judgments about that array may 
be distorted. A depressive who construes the world, himself, and the 
future in a neg~tive way (Beck, l974l finds support for his views in 
his failures- and the negative aspects of the world and life. Seeking 
confirmation of our views may lead to selective attention, and this 
may lead to differential encoding, which would result in distorted 
judgments of frequency wh..en the judgments must be made on all the 
information, not just that to wnich we attended. It is not clear 
wh.ethe.r th.:i::s has produced the distorted absolute frequency judgments 
reported in the depression literature since the relative frequency 
judgments were not silnilarly distorted. 
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Even if frequency information is encoded automatically, it is 
unlikely that the information is retrieved exactly as it is encoded. 
Retrieval of information may be distorted, for example, by the person's 
expectations or biases. Loftus (1975} has shown that eyewitnesses who 
were asked "leading questions" following the witnessed event later 
distorted information about the event in the direction of the biased 
leading question. If a depressive is biased towards negativity, this 
bias could affect accuracy when retrieving frequency information about 
hedonically charged events (e.g., underestimating the amount of rein-
forcement received ~ Nelson & Craighead, 1977) • An opposite bias can be 
seen in nondepresstves. Edwards (cited in Anastasi, 1976) has shown 
that the tendency to choose socially desirable responses on self-report 
inventor~ is not necessarily indicative of deliberate deception. 
People have a tendency to want to .. look good" and this bias lMY have 
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caused t~e di$torted frequency judgments found in the nondepressives 
by Nelson and Craighead Cnondepressives underestimated the amount of 
punisl'unent - \dl..tch was indicative of failure - they had received}. As 
effort towards retrieval ismintmized, these biases should have less of 
an effect on the. fre-quency judgments. For exam~;>le, there may be consider-
able. effort involved in retrieving the t.tem frequencies needed to make 
a judgment of category frequency, but retrieval is minimzied when only 
an item judgment is called for. In other words, expectations or biases 
should have little or no effect on item judgments, but should affect 
category judgments,. 
Clearly, automaticity and availability need not be viewed as 
rival approac~es to the question of how judgments are made for frequency 
information. T~ey sh.ould instead be viewed as approaches explaining 
the processing of frequency information at different stages of that 
processing. 
The Present Experiment 
The difference in methodology between the frequency studies and 
the depression studies leaves an ambiguous situation. With these dif-
ferences, the two sets of studies are not directly comparable, and 
nothing conclusive can be stated about the effect of mood state on 
judgments of frequency of occurrence. The present study intends to 
link t~ese sets of studies and cla:t:'ify this issue. 
Two of ~e. ll).ethological differences W'ill be mani~;>ulated: the. 
type of st.bnuli use.d Cinnocuous/emotionally-chargedl, and the type of 
judgment made by the subject (item/category judgment}. (The third 
difference. - what t.s acce.pte.d as an accurate. judgment - will also be 
examined, but, <mvt.ously does not nee.d to be manipulated.} Statements 
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of self-re.ferenc:;e W'tll be. used as stimuli. Rec:;ent studies (Bower & 
Gill~an, 1979; Rogers, KuiJ?e.r, & Kirker, 19771 have investigated 
self-reference tn memor~. ~~~ found that information judged in refer-
ence to oneself is remembered better than when it is judged in reference 
to ano~er person. In this study, statements of self-reference will be 
used to create emottonally-charge.A and innocuous stimuli. Three cate-
gories of self-reference. statements will be used: positive, negative, 
and neutral. ~amples of th.e.ae would be respectively: "! am fine", 
"~ am a failure.~, "~ like. to watc~ TVn. ~he frequency studies have 
used only innocuous stimuli.; th.e depression studies used emotionally-
c:::~arge.d stimuli. ~ne present experiment will use both types of stimuli 
in one. experiment (innocuous stimuli: neutral statements; emotionally-
charged stimuli: positive. and negative statements} so that any differ-
ences caus.ed by the. tn>e. of stimuli can be examined. As the statements 
also fall into distinct categories (positive, negative, and neutral), 
~e second methodological difference between the frequency studies can 
be. inveat:.tgate.d. :tn th.e. frequency studies, subjects made item judgments, 
while in the. depre.asion studt.es, subjects made category judgments. 
Judgments of frequency of occurrence for each of the statements can be 
gathered, as well as judgments of frequency of occurrence for each 
category of statements .. <J:h.ese judgments of item frequency and category 
frequency can th.en be compared directly. 
<J:o a certain degree, the issue of automaticity and availability 
will also be ~ddressed. As previously discussed, when retrieval of 
frequency information is- minilnized (as in item judgments}, the effect 
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of biases- and expeGtat.tons- of the judgments w-ill also be minimized. 
Therefore, the effect of any bias~ that depressives have toward nega-
tivity and negattve statements or non.depressives have toward positive 
statements (for examplel. W't.ll be mini:mized when they are making judg-
ments- C!.lf item frequency. Judgments for positive and neg~tive items 
should, th.erefore, be as accurate as· judgments for neutral items. How-
ever, wflen retrieval is- not min:btized, as when making category judgments, 
the availability of information should influence frequency judgments. 
Biases and expectations may influence availability and, therefore, have 
an effect on the judgments .. That is, overestimation and underestimation 
may occur in categoq judgments of positive and negative items, but 
should not occur in category judgments of neutral items. Any biases 
of the depressed and nondepressed subjects in this study should, then, 
show their effect in the judgments of category frequency but not in the 
judgments C!.lf item frequency. 
It is hypothesized: 1} For item frequency judgments, the only 
significant effect should be for the actual frequency of the items, 
i.e., as the actual frequency increases, so should the frequency esti-
mates. Since retrieval is minimized wnen making item frequency judgments, 
any biases- caused hy mood and/or statement type should have no effect .. 
2L For category frequency judgments, it is hypothesized that the inter-
action of mood state and statement type will be significant. Since 
retrieval is not minilnized when judging category frequencies, these 
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judgments could be affected hy biases caused by depression. These 
biases snould also appear WQen subjects recall the items. According to 
tne availabiltty neuristic, judgments of category frequency are made 
based on ~e availability of information. I£ after making category 
frequency judgment~ tne subject is asked to recall the items, the items 
recalled ~ould be ~ose whicn ~e sUbject had available to him, i.e., 
th.ose on wh.tch. h.e based nis judgments of category frequency. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized th.at 3t the analysis of the recall data will mimic 
tne analysis of tne category frequency judgments, i.e., the interaction 
of mood and statement type. wtll be stgnificant. 
METHOD 
Subjects, 
Stxty-faur undergraduate students enrolled in introductory 
psych.ology courses- partictpated tn th.e experiment as part of a course 
requtrement .. All subje.cts h.ad be.en given the Beck Depression Inventory 
OSOr: Beck, 1967L prtor to participattng in the experiment. Thirty-two 
subjects wtth. BD~ scores of ten or above were designated as depressed; 
32 subjects ~~ BDr scores of four or less were designated as nondep-
ressed. 
Lists 
Three types of statements were used as stimuli: positive self-
reference statements, negative self-reference statements, and neutral 
self-reference statements. Twelve statments of each type were composed 
to make a pool of 36 statements. The neutral statements were of the 
basic form "r like (object or activity}", e.g., "I like chocolate ice 
cream", "I like to ice skate". Th.e positive and negative statements 
were created as follows: 12 positive adjectives (e.g., "enthusiastic") 
and ~2 negattve adjectives (_e.g., "discouraged") were selected from the 
Depression ~djecttve Check List (OACL; Lubin, 1967). These adjectives 
were used in statements of the basic form "I (am/feel} (adjective)", 
e.g., ":t feel discouraged'1 , "I am unhappy", "I am an easy-going person". 
(See Appendix ~ for a list of all stimuli.} 
Ustng these statements, eigh.t lists were constructed, each con-
taining 69 statements. Four of the lists contained 10 different positive 
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statements, ll different neutra~ statements, and 12 different negative 
statements; the other four lists contained 10 different negative state-
ments, 11 different neutra~ statements, and 12 different positive 
statements. Therefore, the frequenc~ of occurrence of each of the cate-
gories was either 10, 11, or 12 (see Tab~e 2). 
Each individual statement also had a frequency of occurrence in 
the list of one, two, three, or four. In the category from which 10 
items were included in the list, three items occurred in the list only 
one time, three items occurred two times, three items occurred three 
times, and one item occurred four times. In the neutral category, which 
always had 11 items included in the list, four items occurred one time, 
three occurred two times, three occurred three times, and one item 
occurred four times. In the category from which 12 items were included 
in the list, five items occurred one time, three occurred two times, 
three occurred three times, and one item occurred four times. Therefore, 
there were 22 occurrences of 10 items from either the positive or nega-
tive category, 23 occurrences of 11 items from the neutral category, 
and 24 occurrences of 12 items from either the negative or positive 
category (see Table 3}. 
The ~ists were constructed so that approximately one-third of 
the occurrences from each of the categories fell into each third of 
the list. Specifically, of the 22 occurrences of 10 items, seven oc-
curred in tne first third of the list, eight in the second third, and 
seven in the last third; of the 23 occurrences of the 11 neutral items, 
eight occurred in the first third, seven in the second third, and eight 
Table 2 
Number of Unique Statements from Each Category 
(4 lists1 
(4 li:sts1 
Positive 
10 
12 
Category 
Neutral 
11 
11 
Negative 
12 
10 
24 
Table 3 
Construction of the Lists: Number of Different Statements from 
Each Catego~ by their Frequency of Occurrence in the List 
Category 
Frequency Positive Neutral Negative 
J. 3 4 5 
2 3 3 3 
(4 listsl 
3 3 3 3 
4 l 1 1 
1 5 4 3 
2 3 3 3 
(4 listsl 
3 3 3 3 
4 1 1 1 
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in the last third; and, of the 24 occurrences of the 12 items, eight 
occurred in each third of the list. With this restriction, and with 
the restriction that the same item would not occupy adjacent positions, 
the occurrences were randomly assigned to positions in the list. 
Eight lists were constructed, four with the category frequencies 
10-positive, 11-neutral, 12-negative; and four with the category fre-
quencies 12-positi:ve, ll-neutral, 10-negative. Four lists were construct-
ed of each so that each statement would have occurred in the lists with 
a frequency of one, two, three, and four. 
Procedure 
Subjects were instructed that they would see a list of state-
ments and that they were to rate each statement on a 20-point scale 
for the truthfulness of the sentence as it applied to them (20 - state~ 
ment is completely true; l - statement is completely false) • The sub-
jects were informed that all the statements would ask about themselves; 
subjects were told to rate the statements as they applied to how they 
felt "right now, today ... The subjects were also told that some of the 
statements would be repeated and that the statements were repeated so 
that the subjects' consistency in rating could be checked. Subjects 
were cautioned to rate every statement that was presented. 
The list of statements was then presented to the subjects using 
a Kodak Carousel projector. Each statement was presented for 6 sec. 
After presentation of the list, the rating sheets were collected, and 
the subjects- made their frequency judgments. 
One group of subjects (16 depressed and 16 nondepressedl were 
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required to make judgments of item frequency. They were given 42 
statements and were asked to tell how many times each statement had 
appeared in ~e li~t. The 42 statements consisted of the 33 different 
statements presented tn the ltst plus nine new statements. (The response 
forms used i:n the experiment are presented in Appendix B.) 
T~e other group of subjects (16 depressed and 26 nondepressedl 
were required to make judgments of category frequency. The subjects 
were told the three categories, i.e., statements concerning positive 
qualities, statements concerning negative qualities, and statements 
concerning what they like. Examples of each of the categories were 
gtven; these were, respectively: "I feel fine", "I am a failure", 
"I like to watch TV". Subjects were then asked to estimate the number 
of different statements, not the number of total statements (statements 
with repetitionsl, presented in each category. After making these 
estimates. subjects were asked to recall as many of the statements as 
possible. 
RESULTS 
Mood State. 
The subjects were pre-selected for the experiment on the basis of 
their scores on the. Beck Depressi~n Inventory (BDI}. The mean BDI scores 
are presented in Table 4. As the BDr was given to the subjects several 
weeks prior to parttcipation in the experiment, a ratings scales score 
was calculated. for each. subject to serve as· a manipulation check on the 
mood state of th.e subject. During the experiment, subjects rated the 
positive, negative, and neutral self-reference statements on a 20-point 
scale with a rating of l indicating that the statement was completely 
false, and. a rating of 20 meaning the statement was completely true. A 
ratings score for each subject was calculated. by the formula: 
p 
2:: (21-Pi} 
+ i=l 
p 
where RS is the ratings score, Ni is the average rating of a negative 
statement across its repetitions, n is the number of different negative 
statements presented, Pi is the average rating of a positive statement 
across its repetitions, and p is the number of different positive state-
ments presented.. (Ratings of the neutral statements are ignored in the 
calculation of the RS score as the statements, by their very nature, 
were intended to be statements associated with neither depression nor 
nondepression.l In effect, this formula creates scores such that those 
subjects who gave ~~h. ratings to negative statements (rating those 
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Depressed 
n=32 Cn=26L 
Nondepressed. 
n=32 Cn=29)_ 
Table. 4 
Mean Depress-ion Scores 
~4.4~ (14.62}** 
~.63 c 1.52} 
* BDI: = Beck Depression Inventory; 
RS* 
17.55 (1.9.241 
11.31 (10.40) 
RS = s~ores computed from responses on the ratings scales 
** In parentheses are the mean scores after "inconsistent" 
subjects have been removed.. 
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statements to be. truel and low ratings to positive statements (rating 
those statelllents to be falsel will have high RS scores; those subjects 
who gave hi:g-h_ rati-ngs to positive. statements (those are tr-uel_ and low 
ratings to negative statements (those are false} will have low RS 
scores. ~ hi~h RS score i-ndicates that the subject rated himself nega-
tively, wh.tle, a loW' RS score indicates that he rated himself positively. 
The mean RS· scores: are presented in Table 4. 
The RS s~ores were used as a manipulati-on check of the mood state 
of the subject. Any nondepressed subject whose RS score was above the 
mean RS score of the depressed group, and any depressed subject whose R5 
score was below the mean RS score of the nondepressed group were ex-
cluded from the. analyses of the data on the basis that, at the time of 
the experi~ent, the- mood of those subjects was no longer at one of the 
extremes (either depressed or nondepressed) for which the subject had 
been pre-selected. Nine subjects - s-ix depressed (two in the item fre-
quency judgment group and four in the category frequency judgment group) 
and three nondepress~d (two in the item frequency group and one in the 
category frequency groupl - were excluded from the analyses on this 
basi's.. Table. 4 shows in parentheses the mean BDI and RS scores for the 
groups after these subjects have been removed. All analyses of the data 
were performed fi~st wrth. all th~ subjects and then again with these 
subjects removed. As: the resu,!ts of the. an.alyses of the data using all 
the subjects- were_ llasi'Cally· the same as tAe analy-ses with subjects re-
moved, reported, results· will be of analyses using all subjects. Results 
of analyses-wi-th subjects removed follow in parentheses. 
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Item Judgments 
In making ju~gments of item frequency, subjects were required 
to provide estilna.tes for 42 items - 33 "old'l statements and nine "new" 
statements. Each statement was categorized by statement type (positive, 
negative, neutralL and by actual frequency of occurrence (0, 1, 2, 3, 
or 4L The number of st.atements in each. cell of this categorization 
ranged from one. to five. Therefore, the item judgment analyses were 
based on the subjectts mean frequency estimate for each cell. (These 
cell means are presented in Appendix C.l 
The item judgments were analyzed by a 2 (mood state) X 3 (state-
ment typel X 4 Gactual frequencyl analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last two factors (so that it would be comparable to 
Hasher and Zackst (19791 item frequency analysis, zero-frequency items 
were excluded from this analysis}. As hypothesized, for judgments of 
item frequency, the only significant effect was for the actual frequency 
of the items, !:_(3,901 = l05.02, £..< .Ol (see Table 5} (subjects removed: 
~ (.3, 781 = l29.96, £..< .Oll. As actual frequency of the items increased, 
so did the e.stimated frequency. There was no difference between the 
depressed and nondepressed subjects in their estimates, !_<1 (see 
Figure 11. These results are similar to those reported by Hasher and 
Zacks. Also as hypothesized, statement type (positive, negative, or 
neutrall had no effect on judgments of item frequency, !_~1, nor were 
any of the interactions significant. 
A 2 Gftood statel X 3 (_statement typel analysis of variance with 
J::epeated measures on the las·t factor was performed on the zero frequency 
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Table 5 
Analys.is of Variance of Item Frequency Judgments CAll Subjects) 
ss df MS F 
Between S\:lbjects 
M (}tood Stater 6.28 1 6.28 <'1 
S(}tl 387.34 30 12.91 
Within Subjects 
T (Statement 'l'ypel 0.42 2 0.21 <1 
MT 0.45 2 0.2"2 <1 
TS (}tl 38.66 60 0.64 
A (Actual Prequencyl 338.85 3 112.95 105 .01* 
MA 1.90 3 0.63 <1 
AS (}11 96.79 90 1.08 
TA 5.64 6 0.94 2.00 
MTA 0.83 6 0.14 <1 
TAS (}tl 83.6.1 180 0.46 
* £,.<-Ol 
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Figure l. Item frequency estimates for depressed and nondep-
ressed subjects. 
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items. This ~nalysis revealed a significant effect for statement type, 
~ (2,601 ~ 13.91, £~.01. The main effect of mood state and the inter-
action were not si~n±ficant (see Table 61. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
positive zero-f~equency statements were much more likely to be estimated 
as having occurred previousl¥ than were negative and neutral zero-
frequency statements. 
Category Judgments 
The judgments of categeJ;y' frequency were analyzed by a 2 (mood 
statel. X 2 Cli~t type[ X 3 (statement type} analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the last factor. There were two list types in the 
experiment: the list consisted of either 10 positive statements, 11 
neutral statements, and 12 negative statements, or it consisted of 
12 positive, ll neutral, and 10 negative statements. Although there 
were actual differences in the category frequencies between lists, the 
analysis of variance revealed that list type had no effect on the cate-
gory judgments, F (1,281 ~ 1.63, E.~ .OS. 
It was hypothesized that the interaction of mood and statement 
type would have a significant effect on judgments of category frequency. 
This was not the case; the interaction was not significant, F· (2, 56) = 
l.53, E.> .OS (see Table 7l (subjects removed: ~ <1). There was no 
si-gnificant main effect for mood, F'"'- 1 (subjects removed: ~ (1, 23) = 
l.l8, ~~.051, however, the main effect for statement type was signifi-
cant, F (2,561 ~ 4.29, E.<.OS (subjects removed:~ (2,46} = 4.79, 
E. <.OSl. Examination of the overall mean estimates for the three cate-
gories of statement type revealed that positive statements were judged 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance of Judgments of 
Zero-Frequency Items (All Subjects) 
ss df MS F 
Between Subjects 
M (}1ood Statel 0.03 1 0.03 <1 
S(Ml 4.47 30 0.15 
Within Subjects 
T (Statement Typel 3Q5l 2 1.76 13. 91* 
MT 0.07 2 0.04 <1 
TS(Ml 7.58 60 0.13 
* £.< .Ol 
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Figure 2. Frequency est~tes for zero-frequency items from each 
category. 
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Table 7 
Analys~s of Variance of Category Frequency Judgments [All Subjects} 
ss df MS F 
Between Subjects 
M (Mood Statel 123.76 .l 123.76 <1 
L {J..ist Typel 207.09 1 207.09 1.63 
ML 82.5J. 1 82.51 <1 
soor 3553.63 28 126.92 
Within Subjects 
T (Statement Typel 298.90 2 149.45 4.29* 
MT 106.64 2 53.32 1.53 
LT 16.94 2 8.47 ...:::"1 
MLT 45.02 2 22.51 <1 
TS U.U.l 1952.50 56 34.87 
* .e_<.os 
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to be most frequent ex = ~6.061, negative statements were judged to be 
next frequent ex = ~4.161, and neutral statements were always judged to 
be the least fre~ent category (X= ~.751. A Newman-Keuls analysis of 
these means indicated t~t the means for both positive and negative 
statements were significantly different from the mean of the neutral 
statements, but that the means of the positive and negative statements 
did not differ stgnificantly. 
Recall 
The ~ecall data was analyzed by a 2 (mood state} X 2 (list type) 
X 3 (statement typel analysis of variance with repeated measures on the 
last factor. 
It had been hypothesized that the analysis of the recall data 
would mimic the analysis of the category frequency judgments, i.e., it 
was hypothesized that the interaction of mood state and statement type 
would be significant. In the analysis including all subjects, this 
interaction just reached significance, ~ (2,56} = 3.13, £ = .05 (see 
Table 8L. w.Qen subjects were removed from this analysis, instead of 
increasing this interaction (removal of subjects "inconsistent" in 
their mood state ~ould lead to more homogeneous groups and increase 
the differences between the groupsl, the interaction dropped below 
significance, ~ C2,46l = 3.02, ~ = .06. It is debatable, therefore, 
wh.ethe.r thi:s intel:'action. can be considered real. Figure 3 presents the 
mean number of statements recalled in each category. Simple effects and 
Newman-Keul~ analyses indicated that, if real, the interaction lies in 
the recall of the neutral statements. Recall did not differ signifi-
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance of Recall Data 
Between Subjects 
M (Mood State} 
L (List Typel 
ML 
S~l 
Within Subjects 
T (Statement Type} 
MT 
LT 
MLT 
TS (MLl 
* 12. =.05 
** 12. < .0.1 
ss df 
3.62 1 
7.88 1 
7.95 1 
67.91 28 
70.96 2 
12.84 2 
4.96 2 
1.90 2 
114.91 56 
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(All Subjects) 
MS F 
3.62 1.50 
7.88 3.26 
7.95 3.29 
2.42 
35.48 17.29** 
6.42 3.13* 
2.48 1.21 
0.95 <1 
2.05 
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Neutral 
Pi911re. 3. Mea.n number of statements recalled in each category for 
depressed and nondepressed subjects. 
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cantly between positive ~nd negative statements or between depressives 
and nondepress.i;:ve.s for these statements. There was, however, a signifi-
cant difference between depressives and nondepressives for recall of 
the neutral statements. Also, recall of neutral statements differed 
significantly from recall. of both positive and negative statements for 
nondepresstves, whtle recall of neutral statements differed from recall 
of negative statements GPut not from positive statements} for depres-
sives. 
The anAlysis of the recall data did mimic the analysis of the 
category judgments in that the main effect of statement type was signi-
f!icant (}' (2, 561 ~ .17 .. 29, £_ < .. 011, and no other main effect or inter-
action was significant (wtth. the possible exception of the mood state 
by statement type interaction} • However, the pattern of recall for 
statements of various types did not mimic the pattern of category esti-
mates as should follow from the availability heuristic. In the category 
judgments, positive. and negative statements were judged to have occurred 
more frequently than neutral statements. If category judgments are 
based on what is available to the subject, as suggested by the avail-
ability heuristic, then what was avilable to the subject should have 
been positive and negative. statements. However, neutral statements were 
recalled the. most (X ~ 5 .. 001, while positive and negative statements 
were. recalled nth. approxi:mately equal frequency (Xpositive= 3.21, 
X t=--·· ==~ 3 .~SL .. A Newma.n-K.e.uls analysis: indicated the difference 
nega. l..."ve 
between the. neutral statements and the. positive and negative statements 
to be. s:ignifrcant, while the difference between the positive statements 
and the negative sta.tements was not significant. This Newman-ICeuls 
mimics the Newman-ICeuls for category judgments in that positive and 
negat±ve statements do not differ, but they do differ from neutral 
statements. Contrary to th.e availability heuristic, however, the more 
that was available to th.e subject (.i.e .. ~ recalled} , the ·lower was the 
frequency es:t~te .. 
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DISCUSSION 
Individually, the results of the item judgments and the results 
of the category judgments are important for various theories concerning 
the process-ing of frequency information. Taken together, it was hoped 
that they would clarify and/or resolve the apparent conflict of results 
between t.he frequency literature and the depression literature. In 
short, the results· were not able to resolve the conflict, did provide 
support for one the.ory but problems for another, and suggested a recon-
ciliation of the two theories. 
The present study attempted to clarify the effect of mood state 
on judgments of frequency of occurrence by linking two apparently con-
flicting sets of results through the methodological differences between 
the studies producing those results. Briefly, Hasher and Zacks (1979} 
propose that the encoding of frequency information is an automatic 
process and cannot be affected by depression; this is in conflict with 
the depression literature which has shown that depression can affect 
judgments of the frequency of reinforcement and/or punishment. The 
methodological differences between the studies (type of stimuli used, 
type of judgment required} we.re hypothesized to be the cause of this 
apparent conflict. The.refore, an attempt was made to replicate both 
Hashe.r and Zacks' resu].ts and the results of the depression studies in 
one e~pertment. Had both of these results replicated, it would have 
been sh.o~ that judgments· of the same information appeared to be both 
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affected and not affected by depression, depending ~n the type of 
judgments required. Unfortunately, both results were not replicated. 
Hasher and Zacks-' results. were replicated in the item judgments (mood 
did n0t affect ttem judgments}, l>ut the category judgments did not 
replicate. the results· 0f the depression literature (i.e., that depres-
sion affects categsry judgmentsl. Although the results of the depression 
literature were not replicated and i.t was· not shown that depression 
affected the category judgments wh.ile not affecting the item judgments 
thereby· caustng an apparent conflict, the possibility that this could 
happen cannot be ruled out. rn fact, another variable had this very 
effect. ~pe of statement (positive, negative, or neutral) had no effect 
on item judgments, while it did have an effect on category judgments: 
the positive and negative statements were estimated as occurring more 
frequently than neutral statements. I'f one variable can produce this 
apparent confli~t bet~een ite~ and category judgments, it is likely 
that other vartables (e.g., mood statel may also be capable of producing 
thxs apparent conflict. It is proposed that depression did not have 
this effect in th.e pre.sent study because the stimuli used (self-refer-
ence statelllEUltsl were not information that is affected by mood state. 
!n other WOJ'dS·, pa,ting self-reference statements is not equivalent to 
the experience of :;'einforcement/punis:hment used in the depression 
studies. Had sti~li of this nature been used, the possibility exists 
that while depression would be shown to have an effect on judgments of 
category frequency, judgments~ of item frequency would remain unaffected. 
A,lthQU<;Jh the :results of the present study could not resolve the 
issue of now' aepression relates to juagments of frequency, it is im-
portant to ex~ne them in terms of their relationship to various 
theories concerning fre.quency juagments. To be specific, the present 
results bear on Hasher and Zacks' theory of the automaticity of fre-
quency encoding, a,nd on Tversky a,nd l<ahneman's (l973l availability 
heuristic. 
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Hash_er and Zacks·' theroy- that the encoding of frequency is an 
automatic process and cannot be affected by depression was supported 
by the results of the item judgments. It is important to note, however, 
that Hasher and Zacks' theory found support only in judgments of item 
frequency·. A.lth<!>Ugh judC)ltl9nts. of category· frequency were not affected 
by depression, neither did they follow the pattern expected if frequency 
encoding is an autGmatic process. In an experiment by Alba, Chromiak, 
Hasher, and Attig l1.9.80}_, judgments· of category frequency increasea as 
the actual frequency of category· ~emplars increased. They concluded 
from this that category· frequency· was· automatically encoded. However, 
for the category judgments· in the present experiment, the list type by 
statement type interaction was not significant. This indicates that 
the. actual ~re<ttlency of statements .in each category made no difference 
when making tne catego~y judgments:. In Rasher and Zacks • Experiment 3 
and in the I>res.ent ~peri111ent, esti'1Qates of item frequency increased 
wi·th actual fre<Nency. This did not occur in the estimates of category 
frequency. Not only dia actQal f:r:equency 1l)ake no aifference, but the 
category· judgments·we:r:e affected by the type of information that made 
up the category (J:he positive and negative categories we:r:e given highe:r: 
estimates. than the. neutral category regardless of actual frequency}. 
This would. not be expected if frequency was automatically encoded and 
was retrieved as tt had been encoded. 
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'!'h~ res.>Ults:- of the category judgments, along with the recall 
data, also pres-ent a problem for '!'versky and ICahneman's availability 
heuristic. ~c~ord.ing to the availability heuristic, judgments of fre-
quency are 11,1ade on the basi'S: of ava.i:labili:ty, i.e., the ease with which 
relevant i'nstances> come to mi:nd.. 1\vai:labi:li:ty has always been· opera-
tionally defined as,what i~· recalled. rn the present experiment, con-
trary to what wQUld be predicted by the availability heuristic, the 
more that was· recalled from a category, the lower was the estimated 
frequency of that category. Obviously, frequency was not estimated on 
the basis of what could be recalled after making the estimates (pre-
sumably recalling the information on which the estimates were based) • 
Nor are frequency estimates made on the basis of what can be recalled 
before making the estimates. Curt and Zechmeister {1981) had subjects 
recall items prior to making frequency estimates. It was found that the 
estimates were affected by this initial task and that recall did not 
predict the pattern of frequency ~sti~tes made by subjects who did not 
recall i:tems pri~r to ~ing their esti~tes. Thes-e results indicate a 
probleJt~ in defining availabi·li'ty solely in terms of recall. 
Not only do the re~lts· of the categQry jud.9I!Jents and recall 
indicate a problem in defining availability, b~t the res.ults of the 
categQry jud<Jlllents. also lend support to Beyth.-Marom and Fischhoff's 
{l977l proposi-tion that availability is not the only determinant of 
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judged frequency. In their study, it appeared that category judgments 
were influenced by their subjects' knowledge of the lexicographic 
structure of the language. Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff suggest that 
situation-specific factors such as this can influence frequency esti-
mates. A situati'On-specific factor may have influenced the category 
judgments in the present study. Matlin (cited in Matlin, 1979), in a 
study investigating estimates of the background frequency of pleasant, 
neutral, and unpleasant words, found that subjects gave lower frequency 
estimates for neutral words than for pleasant or unpleasant words. 
Essentially the same results were found in the present study. Estimates 
of the situational frequency of neutral items were significantly lower 
than estimates of positive and negative items (which did not differ} • 
It appears that a bias towards estimating emotionally-charged (pleasant 
and unpleasant} items as occurring with a greater frequency than in-
nocuous lneutrall items could have influenced the category judgments 
in this study. 
The results of the present study suggest that both Hasher and 
Zacks' theory of the automaticity of frequency encoding and Tversky 
and Kahnemants availability heuristic need to be amended. The automati-
city theory should specify that it is applicable only to judgments of 
item frequency and not t.o judgments of category frequency. (Although 
Alba et al. (19801 concluded from their results that category frequency 
is automati~ally encoded, in their study only neutral stimuli were 
used, they did not address themselves to the results of the depression 
literature, and they based their conclusion solely on the fact that 
48 
categories with more exemplars in the list were reported to have occur-
red more frequently than categories with fewer exemplars (relative 
frequency judgments} • Using this crit~rion, the same conclusion would 
be drawn from the results of the depression studies since both depres-
sives and nondepressives report higher frequencies of reinforcement 
when they have been reinforced more, and higher frequencies of punish-
ment when they have been punished more (see Review of the Relevant 
Literature, pps. 14-15}. What needs to be explained is the systematic 
distortions that occur in certain types of frequency information for 
certain people. These distortions were not discussed by Alba et al., 
and would not have been expected to appear in a study, such as theirs, 
in which only neutral stimuli were used.) The availability heuristic 
needs to redefine "availability" and account for other factors that 
influence frequency judgments besides availability. Though the results 
of the present study suggest these changes in theory, they also suggest 
and support a reconciliation of the two theories. Since the automaticity 
theory is concerned only with the encoding of frequency information and 
the availability heuristic is used only in the retrieval of information, 
the two theories should be viewed not as rival approaches, but as two 
approaches explaining different stages in the processing of frequency 
information. The two theories can then be reconciled into a more com-
plete theory of the processing of frequency information. In this recon-
ciliation, it is theorized that frequency information about individual 
items is encoded automatically. Since the frequency of individual items 
is encoded, the effort towards retrieval of this information (item 
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judgments} is minimized and the judgments are relatively accurate. On 
the other hand, category frequencies are not encoded automatically. A 
single item could be part of many different categories (e.g., pleasant-
ness vs. unpleasantness, high vs. low imagery, short word vs. long word, 
whether the item describes my cat or not, etc.}, and categories to which 
the item may belong may not even be known until many items have been 
presented. It is doubtful that frequency information is automatically 
encoded for each of the many different categories into which an item 
could belong. Therefore, to make an estimate of the frequency of items 
occurring in a particular category, considerable effort is required: A 
search through all the items is necessary to find those items that make 
up the category. The frequencies of these items must then be retrieved 
and this information complied. As this process takes place, many factors 
could influence the final estimate: for example, the availability of 
the searched-for items, biases peculiar to the type of information 
involved (situation-specific facotrs), or the person's expectations or 
biases about the information and the task he is asked to perform. Fac-
tors such as these could distort the final category judgment so that it 
would appear that the information had not been automatically encoded. 
The results of the present study support this proposed reconciliation 
of the two theories: the item judgments were accurate while the category 
judgments were not, and the category judgments could have been biased 
by a general tendency to estimate higher frequencies for emotionally-
charged items than for innocuous items. 
The preceding reconciliation of the two theories provides a more 
complete model of the processing of frequency information. Needless to 
say, further research is now needed to substantiate this model. 
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APPENDIX A 
Positive Self-Reference Statements 
I am a hea.lthy person. I am enthusiastic, 
I feel opt.:Unisti:c .. I feel alert, 
I am lucky. I feel light-hearted .. 
I am a lively person .. I am composed. 
I feel bright. I feel peaceful. 
I am an easy-going pel; son .. I feel light. 
Negative Self--Reference Statements 
I feel dejected. I am unhappy. 
I am discouraged. I am exhausted. 
I feel burdened. I am a moody person. 
I feel chained. I am weary. 
I am crestfallen. I feel gloomy. 
I feel alone. I feel miserable. 
Neutral Self-Reference Statements 
I like chocolate ice cream. I like to ice skate. 
I like rases. I like science fiction stories·. 
I like to sa to movies. I like to sleep. 
I. like to I;"ead .. I like to go to the zoo. 
I like cats· .. r like summer. 
I like th._e calor green. r like to jag. 
APPENDIX B 
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APPENDIX B 
Response. Form for Judgments of Item Frequency 
I feel alert. 
I am enthusiastic. 
I am unhappy. 
I am unfeeling • 
I am composed. 
I like to re.ad. 
I am discouraged. 
I like to sleep. 
I like to ski. 
I feel alive. 
I feel optimistic. 
I feel peaceful. 
I like chocolate ice cream. 
I am lucky. 
I feel alone. 
I like the .. color green. 
I am exhausted. 
I like, rose.s. 
I feel 111iserable .• 
I feel. gl.oomy. 
I ama· lively person. 
~ am crestfallen. 
I like summer. 
I am a moody person. 
I like strawberries. 
I like science fiction stories. 
I feel dejected. 
I like to jog. 
I feel burdened. 
I feel bright. 
I like to ice skate. 
I am hopeful. 
I am weary. 
I am a healthy person. 
I am an easy-going person. 
I feel chained. 
I like to go to the zoo. 
I like cats. 
I feel poor. 
I feel light-hearted. 
I feel light. 
I like to go to movies. 
Response Form for Judgments of Category Frequency 
Positive Qualities 
Negative Qualities 
Neutral Statements 
C"r like ••• "I 
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APPENDIX C 
Cell Means for Item Frequency Estimates 
Actual Frequency 
0 1 2 3 4 
D 0.38 1.34 2.48 3.17 3.75 
Positive 
Statements 
ND 0.48 l. 79 2.94 3.29 3.81 
D 0.03 1.29 2.31 3.06 3.94 
Negative 
Statements 
ND 0.05 1. 75 2.67 3.25 4.25 
D 0.02 1.08 2.31 3.02 4.25 
Neutral 
Statements 
ND 0.00 1.36 2.65 3.25 4.06 
Note: Each mean is based on an n of 16. 
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